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Military Courage and Fear 
in the Late Medieval French Chivalric Imagination 
 
 
Abstract : Chivalric literature offered a powerful celebration of courage and denunciation of 
the shame of cowardice. This article explores the relationship between late medieval French 
debates on this subject and the military reality of the period. 
 
Résumé : La littérature chevaleresque offre une célébration forte du courage et une 
dénonciation de la honte que représente la lâcheté. Cet article explore le lien entre les débats 
français sur ce sujet à la fin du Moyen Âge et la réalité militaire de l’époque. 
 
 
Medieval chivalric literature celebrated courage and bravery as defining 
characteristics of the worthy knight.1 The central importance of courage and bravery 
often suggested that losing a battle or even one’s life was preferable to the shame of 
cowardice.2 In La Chanson de Roland, the eponymous hero called upon his men to 
fight bravely in the battle of Roncesvalles so that no one would sing a shameful song 
about them afterwards. Moreover Roland was true to his own advice, even refusing 
to blow his horn to summon aid when the tide of the battle turned. Though his 
refusal to act led to the death of both himself and his men, the Christians ultimately 
won the battle and Roland himself was carried to heaven by Saint Gabriel.3 The 
bravery and self-sacrifice of Roland and Olivier became one of the touchstones of 
chivalry. In Les Vœux du héron (c. 1346), Jean de Hainault, count of Beaumont, 
accused his fellow knights of believing that they were the equals of Oliver and 
Roland.4 Not long afterwards, the Chanson de Bertrand du Guesclin (c.1380) 
                                                            
1 I explore late medieval French debates about the martial, chivalric qualities and values of 
honour, prowess, loyalty, courage, mercy and wisdom in my forthcoming monograph : 
C. D. Taylor, Chivalry, Honour and Knighthood in France During the Hundred Years War. 
For important introductions to the history of courage in the age of chivalry, see P. Contamine, 
War in the Middle Ages, Oxford, Blackwells, 1984, p. 250-9 ; J. F. Verbruggen, The Art of 
Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages, From the Eighth Century to 1340, 2nd 
edition, Woodbridge, Boydell and Brewer, 1997, p. 27-60 ; A. Taylor, “Chivalric 
Conversation and the Denial of Male Fear”, Conflicted Identities and Multiple Masculinities. 
Men in the Medieval West, ed. J. Murray, New York, Garland Publishing, 1999, p. 169-88 ; 
M. K. Jones, “The Battle of Verneuil (17 August 1424) : towards a history of courage”, War 
in History, 9, 2002, p. 375-411. Also see W. I. Miller, The Mystery of Courage, Cambridge 
MA, Harvard University Press, 2000. 
2 J. Delumeau, La Peur en Occident, XIVe-XVIIIe siècles : une cité assiégée, Paris, Fayard, 
1978, p. 20-37. 
3 La Chanson de Roland, ed. G. J. Brault, University Park, The Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1978. 
4 The Vows of the Heron (Les vœux du héron) : a Middle French Vowing Poem, ed. 
J. L. Grigsby and N. J. Lacy, New York, Garland Publishing, 1992, p. 52, and see footnote 44 
below. 
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reported that the Constable of France had earned more honour than any “chevaliers 
puis le temps de Rolant” and repeatedly compared Bertrand with his illustrious 
predecessor.5  
Amongst late medieval knights, perhaps the epitome of chivalric bravery was 
Jean of Luxembourg, king of Bohemia, who died while fighting for King Philip VI 
at the battle of Crécy on 26 August 1346. In Jean Froissart’s famous account, the 
blind Bohemian king rode into battle, led on either side by his retainers. Together 
they fought most bravely but all died and were found the next day lying around their 
leader, their horses still bound together.6 Of course, Froissart neglected to mention 
that the Bohemian king may have had a very personal reason for sacrificing his life, 
as he sought to redeem himself after he had abandoned the field at the battle of 
Vottem against the Liègois on 19 July 1346, just a month before Crécy.7 
Chivalric writers were unequivocal about the shame of cowardice. In 
Lancelot do Lac, the Lady of the Lake declared that knights should be more afraid 
of suffering shame than of dying, and Lancelot agreed that the only thing preventing 
a man from being valorous was indolence, because courage came from the heart 
alone.8 Jean Froissart was deeply scornful of those who fled from the battlefield. For 
example, he reported the story of Wauflars de la Crois who shamefully abandoned 
Sir William Balliol and their men, and fled into a marsh where he was discovered by 
his enemies who killed him, refusing to ransom such a coward.9 During the night of 
the 22 December 1439, the English army boldly relieved Avranches, putting the 
French garrison to flight. The anonymous Bourgeois of Paris reported that the 
French “firent lever le siege a grant deshonneur”, while the account in the 
Chronique d’Arthur de Richemont, the commander of the French force, claimed that 
the Constable had wished to hold firm but was persuaded to retreat because so many 
of his soldiers had broken ranks “sans ordennance”.10 Georges Chastelain reported 
on the public shaming by duke Charles the Bold of Bishop Louis de Bourbon and 
the lord of Boussu for their cowardice in abandoning Huy to the army of Liége in 
                                                            
5 Jean Cuvelier, La Chanson de Bertrand du Guesclin de Cuvelier, éd. J.-C. Faucon, t. I, 
Toulouse, Éditions universitaires du Sud, 1990-3, p. 6, 77, 189, 201 and 468. 
6 Jean Froissart, Chroniques, t. III, 1342-1346, éd. S. Luce, Paris, Société de l’Histoire de 
France, 1872, p. 178-9 and id., Chroniques. Dernière rédaction du premier livre. Édition du 
manuscrit de Rome Reg. lat. 869, éd. G. T. Diller, Genève, Droz, 1972, p. 730-1. Also see 
Jean Le Bel, Chronique de Jean le Bel, éd. J. Viard and E. Déprez, Paris, Société de l’Histoire 
de France, 1904, t. II, p. 108. 
7 A. Ayton, “The battle of Crécy : context and significance”, The Battle of Crécy, 1346, ed. 
A. Ayton and P. Preston, Woodbridge, Boydell and Brewer, 2005, p. 24-5, together with 
C. Gaier, “La bataille de Vottem, 19 juillet 1346”, Armes et combats dans l’univers médiéval, 
t. I, éd. C. Gaier, Brussels, de Boeck, 1995, p. 27-37 and K. De Vries, Infantry Warfare in the 
Early Fourteenth Century, Woodbridge, 1996, p. 150-4. 
8 Lancelot do Lac : the Non-Cyclic Old French Prose Romance, ed. E. Kennedy, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1980, t. I, p. 298, 406 and 571. 
9 Jean Froissart, Chroniques, t. II, 1340-1342, éd. S. Luce, Paris, Société de l’Histoire de 
France, 1870, p. 60-2. 
10 Journal d’un Bourgeois de Paris, 1405 à 1449, publié d’après les manuscrits de Rome et de 
Paris, éd. A. Tuetey, Paris, Société de l’Histoire de France, 1881, p. 350-1 and Guillaume 
Gruel, Chronique d’Arthur de Richemont, connétable de France, duc de Bretagne, 1393-
1459, éd. A. La Vavasseur, Paris, Société de l’Histoire de France, 1890, p. 156-7. 
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September 1467. Boussu came in for particular scorn because he had been charged 
with the defence by duke Charles the Bold, but left at the behest of the bishop.11 
The shame of cowardice was also a central theme of more didactic writings. 
In the Livre de chevalerie, Geoffroi de Charny advised young men-at-arms who 
wanted to be strong and of good courage, to fear shame more than death : “gardez 
que vous prisiez moins la mort que la honte”. He believed that the root of cowardice 
was the fear of dying. Those who loved comfort and wealth feared death, unlike real 
men of worth who had no fear of either suffering or death.12 In the Lay de vaillance, 
Eustache Deschamps praised the Romans who never ran away or retreated but 
preferred to die at their posts, thereby winning true renown.13 In Le Livre des quatre 
dames, written in the immediate aftermath of the disastrous battle of Agincourt in 
1415, Alain Chartier presented four ladies who were overwhelmed with grief for 
their lovers who had taken part in the encounter. The final lady could take no 
consolation in the fact that her lover had survived the battle, because he had been a 
coward who had fled from the field. Her grief and shame at her lover’s behaviour 
served as ample commentary on the thousands of soldiers who had broken ranks, 
saving their own lives at the expense of their fellow Frenchmen. Indeed, Chartier 
viewed this failure as ample evidence of a crisis in chivalry itself, as he made a 
direct link between their cowardice on the battlefield and their faithlessness in love, 
arguing that one kind of treason led to another.14  
Drawing upon the advice of Vegetius in the Epitoma rei militaris, Christine 
de Pizan advised that retreating before the battle had been joined was dishonourable 
for two reasons : “l’une, que il ait paour et que couardie le meut ; l’autre, que petite 
fiance a en sa gent. Et avecques ce donna hardement aux ennemis”.15 She called 
upon noblemen to be courageous on the battlefield, emphasising their duty to 
sacrifice their blood or life for the sake of the prince, the country and the “chose 
publique”, but also the penalty of death and dishonour for fleeing from the 
battlefield out of fear.16 Jean de Bueil argued that the virtue of courage or “force” 
                                                            
11 George Chastellain, Œuvres, éd. K. de Lettenhove, Brussels, 1863-8, t. V, p. 332-4. 
12 Geoffroi de Charny, The Book of Chivalry of Geoffroi de Charny : Text, Context and 
Translation, ed. R. W. Kaeuper and E. Kennedy, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1996, p. 128 and 132. 
13 Eustache Deschamps, Œuvres complètes, éd. A. H. E. Saint-Hilaire and G. Raynaud, Paris, 
Société de l’Histoire de France, 1878-1903, t. II, p. 219 ; see also p. 233. 
14 Alain Chartier, The Poetical Works of Alain Chartier, ed. J. C. Laidlaw, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1974, p. 275 and 280 ; also D. Delogu, “Le Livre des quatre 
dames d’Alain Chartier : complaintes amoureuses, critiques sociales”, Le Moyen Français, 
48, 2001, p. 7-21 and my forthcoming article, “Alain Chartier and Chivalry”, A Companion to 
Alain Chartier, ed. D. Delogu, E. Cayley and J. E. McRae, Leiden, Brill, 2013. 
15 C. M. Laennec, Christine “Antygrafe” : Authorship and Self in Prose Works of Christine de 
Pizan With an Edition of BN fr. MS 603, Le Livre des fais d’armes et de chevallerie, Ph.D. 
dissertation, Yale University, 1988, p. 74-5 ; also Flavius Vegetius Renatus, Epitoma rei 
militaris, ed. M. D. Reeve, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 109. 
16 Christine de Pizan, Le Livre du corps de policie, éd. A. J. Kennedy, Paris, Honoré 
Champion, 1998, p. 62. 
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was found in those “qui aymoient mieulx mourir en combatant que fuyr a leur 
deshonneur”.17 
In the Enseignements paternels, written in the 1430s by Hugues de Lannoy, 
the narrator warned his son that it was better to die honourably than to be shamed by 
cowardice, and therefore urged his son to accept death in battle rather than come 
back in shame.18 Lannoy cited Valerius Maximus, Livy, Lucan, Orosius, Sallust and 
Justin as authors who provided examples of men who faced death both for the sake 
of the public weal and to preserve their own reputations. He also recounted the story 
of the Burgundian Louis Robessart, who had died on 27 November 1430 when he 
and his men had encountered a force of French and Scottish soldiers near Amiens. 
Robessart had preferred to face death rather than take shelter in a castle, though he 
did order his men to withdraw when the battle was lost.19 Instrumental in his 
decision may well have been his obligations as a member of the Order of the Garter, 
especially so soon after Sir John Fastolf had left his fellow members of the Order, 
Talbot and Scales, to be captured at the battle of Patay on 18 June 1429.20 Moreover, 
Louis de Châlon and Jean de Montagu-Neufchatel had also been expelled from the 
Order of the Golden Fleece after abandoning the field at Anthon on 11 June 1430.21 
 
Chivalric Culture and Military Reality 
Many military historians have been optimistic about the effectiveness of 
chivalric narratives and culture as a means to instil bravery and a willingness to 
endure injury and even death in battle, rather than incur the shame of cowardice. 
Jones has argued that chivalric “tales did not serve as a diversion from war, or an 
idealization of it. Rather they formed an exemplar, a scale of values, that was as 
important in practice as in the imagination of the reader.”22 Indeed, one school of 
military historians has emphasised the central importance of culture in warfare, 
shaping the expectations that soldiers had of warfare and of behaviour in battle.23 
                                                            
17 Jean de Bueil, Le Jouvencel par Jean de Bueil, suivi du commentaire de Guillaume 
Tringant, éd. C. Favre and L. Lecestre, Paris, Société de l’Histoire de France, 1887-9, t. I, 
p. 51. 
18 Œuvres de Gilbert de Lannoy : voyageur, diplomate et moraliste, éd. C. Potvin, Louvain, 
Lefever, 1878, p. 460 ; also ibid., p. 456-7, along with B. Sterchi, “Hugues de Lannoy, auteur 
de l’Enseignement de vraie noblesse, de l’Instruction d’un jeune prince et des Enseignements 
paternels”, Le Moyen Âge, 110, 2004, p. 79-117. 
19 Lannoy does not provide the full historical details of the encounter, which appear in Jean 
Lefèvre, Chronique de Jean Le Févre, seigneur de Saint-Remy, éd. F. Morand, Paris, Société 
de l’Histoire de France, 1867-81, t. II, p. 194-5 and Georges Chastellain, Œuvres, t. II, p. 133-
5. Also see D. A. L. Morgan, “From a death to a view : Louis Robessart, Johan Huizinga and 
the political significance of chivalry”, Chivalry and the Renaissance, ed. S. Anglo, 
Woodbridge, Boydell Press, 1990, p. 93-5. 
20 See footnote 99 below. 
21 Registres de la Toison d’Or, t. I, fol. 2v, cited in M. H. Keen, The Laws of War in the Late 
Middle Ages, London, Routledge, 1965, p. 108. 
22 M. K. Jones, “The relief of Avranches (1439) : an English feat of arms at the end of the 
Hundred Years War”, England in the Fifteenth Century, ed. N. Rogers, Stamford, Harlaxton 
Medieval Studies, 1992, p. 42. 
23 This approach is particularly associated with the work of John Keegan and Victor Davis 
Hanson, and for debates about this in regard to the medieval period, see for example R. Abels, 
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Medieval writers certainly claimed that their chivalric stories were 
powerfully effective. Jean Froissart famously presented his Chroniques as a means 
to instil courage in young men. The preface famously stated : 
 
Et ce sera à yaus matère et exemples de yaus encoragier en bien faisant, car la 
memore des bons et li recors des preus atisent et enflament par raison les coers des 
jones bacelers, qui tirent et tendent à toute perfection d’onneur, de quoi proèce est li 
principaus chiés et li certains ressors.24  
 
Within the pages of the Chroniques, there were plenty of inspirational figures 
for a young squire, including Edward of Woodstock, the Black Prince, who 
successfully earned his spurs in 1346 at the battle at Crécy, in front of his father 
Edward III.25 Even more blunt about the power of such stories was Jean de 
Montreuil in his treatise A toute la chevalerie. Writing on the eve of Henry V’s 
invasion of France in 1415, Montreuil provided an inventory of the great French 
heroes and successes of the past, addressed to the “chevalerie de France” so that the 
text might encourage them to “mettre a cuer la prouesce et vaillance de voz bons 
predecesseurs”.26  
Yet chivalric narratives rarely paid attention to the psychological reality of 
fear occasioned by real military encounters.27 If they did discuss such matters, it was 
indirectly, either through reports of heavily unbalanced casualty figures that 
suggested that one side had panicked, or through their reports of pre-battle 
orations.28 Few writers discussed the fear or stress that warfare might bring, and 
hence engaged with the notion that courage represented a personal triumph over 
fear. In other words, chivalric courage and cowardice were usually represented 
externally, in terms of behaviour, rather than internally and psychologically. 
Chivalric courage was performed and witnessed by others rather than a triumph over 
fear or a character trait.29  
The fact that chivalric narratives rarely examined the real emotions of 
soldiers on the battlefield is perhaps not surprising given that the writers had 
                                                                                                                                           
“Cultural representation and the practice of war in the Middle Ages”, Journal of Medieval 
Military History, 6, 2008, p. 1-31 and J. A. Lynn, “Chivalry and chevauchée : the ideal, the 
real and the perfect in medieval warfare”, Battle : a History of Combat and Culture from 
Ancient Greece to Modern America, Cambridge, MA, Basic Books, 2003, p. 73-109. 
24 Jean Froissart, Chroniques, t. I, 1307-1340, ed. S. Luce, Paris, Société de l’Histoire de 
France, 1869, p. 3. 
25 Jean Froissart, Chroniques, éd. cit., t. III, 1342-1346, p. 182-3. 
26 Jean de Montreuil, Opera, éd. cit., t. II. L’Œuvre historique et polémique, ed. N. Grévy, 
E. Ornato and G. Ouy, Torino, Giappichelli, 1975, p. 91. 
27 Taylor, “Chivalric conversation and the denial of male fear”, p. 174. 
28 In 360 orations recorded in 92 chronicles written between 1000 and 1250, “The authors 
plainly thought it essential to show leaders pleading with knights not to run from battle.” 
J. R. E. Bliese, “When knightly courage may fail : battle orations in medieval Europe”, The 
Historian, 53, 1991, p. 504. 
29 Miller, The Mystery of Courage, op. cit., p. 6, and also Y. H. Harari, “Martial illusions : war 
and disillusionment in twentieth-century and Renaissance military memoirs”, Journal of 
Military History, 69, 2005, p 70. Also see id., Renaissance Military Memoirs. War, History, 
and Identity, 1450-1600, Woodbridge, Boydell and Brewer, 2004, p. 133-48 and 152-5. 
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extremely limited experience of warfare and were inevitably influenced by their own 
agendas and inhibitions when writing about martial activities. Their accounts of 
courage and cowardice were not simple mirrors to the society around them, but 
rather active attempts to champion an idealized model of heroic, virtuous courage. 
Chivalric tales were influenced by genre, literary stylings and cultural expectations, 
and therefore produced simplistic and even unrealistic narratives.  
This is very much in accord with parallel narratives written in other warrior 
societies. Classical Roman heroic tales paid no attention to the “complex and elusive 
psychology of courage” and did not attempt to recreate the mind-set of ordinary 
soldiers in war.30 Indeed, such tales have rarely attempted to consider the real 
emotions of warriors. William Ian Miller has argued that  
 
No one doubts that soldiers are afraid. There have been, through time, different 
views as to whether it was acceptable for them to admit openly that they were, but 
fear was clearly always a gloomy and tormenting omnipresence. Those few who qualify 
as genuine berserks aside, the dominant passion in battle, the one each party expects its 
comrades and its opponents to be intimately involved with, is fear. We might see all 
heroic literature as a desperate attempt to keep it at bay. One pays homage to it by 
working hard to deny it in oneself and to insult one’s opponent with it.31  
 
Of course, the people with the most reason to hide the reality of the emotions 
of war would have been military veterans, who were unlikely to admit to having felt 
fear or despair, not only to save their own honour but also to shield their families 
from the real horrors of war, especially the young boys who still had to face their 
own tests in battle. There was a great difference between remembering for oneself 
and for those who had experienced war, and representing the experience to others 
who had never seen battle. 
It is only in recent history that first-hand military memoirs, letters and diaries 
have exposed the deeper emotions occasioned by warfare, submerged underneath 
the conventions of heroic narratives.32 The authors of these modern records may not 
have been completely objective witnesses, their memories distorted or reshaped for 
consumption by a wider audience, and as writers, they were liable to take a more 
intellectual approach to the experience of war than their former comrades in arms. 
Nevertheless, such sources, when read with appropriate care, offer insight into the 
experience of soldiers dealing with the challenges of warfare, from the terror of the 
battlefield to the deep emotional burden of ending the life of another human being. 
In contrast, the individuals represented in heroic narratives are usually presented in 
more simple terms, as unfailingly brave and stoic men or as cowards. Such tales 
offer such a stark polarization that there is little room for either a more complicated 
                                                            
30 W. V. Harris, “Readings in the narrative literature of Roman courage”, Representations of 
War in Ancient Rome, ed. S. Dillon and K. E. Welch, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2006, p. 303 and 316. 
31 W. I. Miller, “Weak legs : misbehavior before the enemy”, Representations, 70, 2000, 
p. 41. 
32 Harari, “Martial illusions...”, p. 51 and 65, and id., Renaissance Military Memoirs, op. cit., 
p. 94-8, together with J. Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing. Face-to-Face Killing in 
Twentieth-Century Warfare, London, Granta, 1999, p. 16-26 and 64-7. 
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vision of bravery or a proper analysis of the emotions of panic, fear or trauma that 
battle must have elicited in the minds of warriors. Taylor has argued that a need to 
cover up weakness and fear is always inherent in military culture, which in turn 
means that the stories told by and about soldiers encourage bravery and courage 
rather than revealing weakness and insecurity.33  
Reflecting on his experience of the Vietnam war, Tim O’Brien admitted that 
“It is more difficult, however, to think of yourself [...] as the eternal Hector, dying 
gallantly. It is impossible. That’s the problem. It’s sad when you learn you’re not 
much of a hero.”34 This raises important questions about the influence of heroic 
constructions of courage upon soldiers facing the reality of the battlefield 
psychology. During the age of chivalry, did the bravado of cultural representation of 
courage and cowardice have a direct and genuine impact upon the emotions of 
medieval soldiers ? When chivalric narratives and chivalric culture in general valued 
actions over emotions, presented a polarized dichotomy between courage and 
cowardice, and paid little attention to complex psychology and emotion, did this 
actually limit the emotional landscape for soldiers ?  
Many scholars assume that human reactions to battle and warfare have been 
consistent throughout history. For example, Chrissanthos has argued that “Even 
though ancient and modern soldiers are separated by great gulfs in time, culture, and 
technology, warfare had a dramatic effect on those in combat and, despite the above 
differences, human beings generally respond in similar ways to what in many 
respects were similar military experiences. Therefore when some human beings are 
subjected to extremely difficult living conditions and the trauma of combat, certain 
responses are ‘predictable’ due to ‘biochemical and physiological’ factors.”35 Yet 
historians of emotions have increasingly emphasised the importance of social and 
cultural conditioning. Cognitive psychology holds that emotions are the response to 
stimuli that combine not only physiological reactions but also cognitive evaluations, 
appraisals and perceptions. Though emotions are universal, the way in which they 
are triggered, experienced and displayed may be affected by cultural norms and 
individual personality. Public emotions like courage and cowardice will be 
particularly susceptible to social and cultural norms. As a result, emotions and the 
display of emotions are not human constants, but are rather formed and shaped by 
society, community and culture, and therefore vary according to place and time.36 
                                                            
33 Taylor, “Chivalric conversation and the denial of male fear”, p. 181. 
34 T. O”Brien, If I Die in a Combat Zone Box Me Up and Ship Me Home, New York, 
Delacorte Press, 1973, p. 146. 
35 S. Chrissanthos, “Aeneas in Iraq : comparing the Roman and modern battle experience”, 
Experiencing War : Trauma and Society in Ancient Greece and Today, 
ed. M. B. Cosmopoulos, Chicago, Ares Publisher, 2007, p. 225, and also L. A. Tritle, From 
Melos to My Lai : War and Survival, London, Routledge, 2000, p. 8. 
36 B. H. Rosenwein, “Worrying about emotions in history”, American Historical Review, 107, 
2002, p. 821-45, and id., Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages, Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, 2006 ; also P. Hyams, Rancor and Reconciliation in Medieval England, 
Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2003, p. 34-68. Also K. R. Scherer, “Emotions, 
psychological structure of”, International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral 
Sciences, ed. N. J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes, Oxford, Elsevier, 2001, p. 4472-7 ; P. N. Stearns, 
“Emotions, history of”, ibid., p. 4466-72. 
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Such notions might suggest that the celebration of courage within chivalric culture 
could have been a powerful influence upon contemporary men-at-arms. 
Of course, it is important to emphasise that the discussion of martial fear was 
not a completely taboo subject within chivalric culture. Writers did engage with the 
subject, usually within chansons de geste and romances that dealt with more distant 
events and contexts, and therefore did not challenge contemporary behaviour and 
actions.37 Moreover, military veterans were often direct about the fear inspired by the 
battlefield. For example, Jean de Wavrin recollected that at Verneuil in 1424, there 
“nestoit homme tant feust hardy ou asseure quy ne doubtast la mort” during the most 
fierce battle that the chronicler had ever seen.38 Geoffroi de Charny graphically 
described the horror of the battlefield in the Livre Charny, calling upon his audience 
to imagine the enemy advancing towards them with their lances lowered and their 
swords ready, while arrows and crossbow bolts rained down, and the bodies of 
friends lay upon the ground all around. Faced by such horrors, Charny suggested, a 
man-at-arms would draw strength from the greater fear of dishonouring himself by 
running away, but also because he could imagine himself to be on the verge of 
martyrdom.39 Returning to the same theme in his Livre de chevalerie, Charny urged 
men-at-arms not to think of defeat, flight or the risk of capture when advancing into 
battle, but instead to focus on what they would do to the enemy. He advised them 
that in order to find courage, they should fear shame and hate cowardice more than 
death.40 Less well-known is the advice that King Duarte of Portugal offered on the 
fear that might beset a jouster, as he bore down on his opponent in the lists. In his 
fifteenth-century Portugese handbook on jousting and knightly combat, Duarte 
graphically described the emotions that affected the jouster whose fear might 
commonly cause him to close his eyes during combat.41 
Moreover clerical writers also warned that heroic tales might instil a false 
sense of bravado that would quickly evaporate as soon as the warrior faced real 
danger and fear in battle. Peter of Blois drew attention to those knights who painted 
great battle scenes on their shields but then ran away from battle to protect 
themselves and their works of art.42 John of Salisbury criticized those men who 
boasted before and after battle, presenting themselves as Achilles and other heroes 
of the Trojan war, but carefully hid themselves away from any real combat. He 
                                                            
37 A. Lynch, “Beyond shame : chivalric cowardice and Arthurian narrative”, Arthurian 
Literature, 23, 2006, p. 1-17. 
38 Jean de Wavrin, Recueil des croniques et anciennes istoires de la Grant Bretaigne, a 
present nommé Engleterre, par Jehan de Waurin, seigneur de Forestel, from A.D. 1422 to 
A.D. 1431, ed. W. Hardy, London, Rolls Series, p. 112, and in general, p. 107-18. 
39 A. Piaget, “Le Livre Messire Geoffroy de Charny”, Romania, 26, 1897, p. 401-2 and 
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claimed that such men recast their cowardice into dazzling tales of their glory that 
were to be passed on by their descendants.43  
This theme was most famously dramatized in the Vœux du héron, a French 
poem probably written around 1346 by an anonymous writer from the Low 
Countries. The work was almost certainly written as a criticism of Edward III and 
the English aristocracy for the brutal war that they had waged in the Cambrésis. The 
villain of the piece, Robert of Artois, carefully manipulated the English king and his 
closest companions into taking up arms against King Philip VI, shaming them into 
making extravagant and often chilling promises to commit acts of great brutality in 
France. At the climax of the event, Jean de Hainault, count of Beaumont denounced 
the boasting of his fellow knights : 
 
Mes de tant de paroles me vois moult mervillant. 
Vantise ne vaut nïent qui n’a achievement. 
Quant sommes es tavernes, de ches fors vins boevant, 
Et ches dames de les, qui nous vont regardant, 
A ches gorgues polies, ches coheres tirant, 
Chil oeil vair resplendissent de beauté sourriant, 
Nature nous semont d’avoir ceur desirant 
De contendre, a le fin de merchi atendant ; 
Adont conquerons nous Yaumont et Agoulant, 
Et li autre conquerent Olivier et Roland. 
Mais quant sommes as camps sour nos destriers courans, 
Nos escus a no col et no lanches baissans, 
Et le frodure grande nous va tous engelans, 
Li membre nous effond[r]ent, et derrier et devant, 
Et nous anemis sont envers nous aprochant, 
Adont vauriemes estre en un chelier si grant 
Que jamais ne fuissons veü ne tant ne quant. 
De si faite vantise ne donroie .i. besant !44 
 
This speech offered a sophisticated and extremely rare analysis of bravery 
within chivalric culture. First and foremost, Hainault accused his fellow knights of 
wishing to emulate the deeds of the heroes of chivalric literature like Roland and 
Olivier, thereby acknowledging the power of such tales. Yet it is less the influence 
of such heroic stories than direct peer pressure that inflamed Edward III and his 
knights. Robert of Artois had carefully stage-managed a great chivalric feast, with 
alcohol flowing liberally and young ladies present to magnify the pressure of the 
situation. It was this context that gave such power to the chivalric tales and boasts, 
as the knights wished to impress each other and the women present, and to avoid the 
shame of being accused of cowardice. In other words, it was not solely the chivalric 
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tales that inspired the protagonists in the poem, but rather the wider chivalric culture 
which placed so much pressure on the participants. 
Secondly, the Vœux du héron drew stark attention to the difference between 
the bravado of knights in courtly contexts like the great feast of the heron, and the 
reality of the medieval battlefield. There was an important difference between 
inspiring an individual to sign up for war while he was safe amongst friends at court, 
and then maintaining his morale during a long, arduous campaign or enabling him to 
overcome his fear at a battle or siege. Faced by such horrors and grave dangers, 
suggested Jean de Hainault, it is difficult to imagine that courage founded upon a 
desire to emulate Roland and Olivier would last long. Indeed, the Vœux du héron 
offered a rare glimpse behind the curtain on the frightening reality of the medieval 
battlefield and dared to expose the emotions of real war, in Hainault’s effort to show 
that bravado at court was not the same thing as having the true courage to master 
fear on the battlefield.  
 
Courage, Cowardice and Rashness 
Lurking behind the analysis of chivalric courage offered in the Vœux du 
héron was a sophisticated debate about bravery and fear by medieval theologians 
and clerics who were concerned with courage within a moral and virtuous 
framework, given that it was one of the four Christian cardinal virtues.45 Bravery 
was invaluable not merely for soldiers risking their life in war, but also for all 
Christians struggling to find strength (fortitudo) in the face of all manner of 
challenges to their faith, and which was most clearly exemplified by the saints and 
martyrs rather than by chivalric heroes.  
Medieval thinking about courage was heavily influenced by the careful and 
nuanced approach offered by Aristotle (384-327BC) in his Nicomachean Ethics. 
Aristotle believed that true courage could only be demonstrated when the goal was 
noble and when facing one’s fears for the right reason.46 The truly brave man would 
act for what was right and honourable, rather than out of lesser motivations such as a 
desire for civic honours, fear of pain and punishment, confidence in one’s training 
and skills, instinct, anger, optimism or just plain ignorance of danger.47  
Such moralizing was of great significance for medieval theologians, even if 
the rejection of lesser motivations for fortitude did risk undermining some 
practically useful ways to encourage martial bravery. Nevertheless, the Aristotelian 
emphasis upon acts of courage performed in service to others did provide an 
important adjunct to a wider Valois rhetoric of public service. Around 1375, Nicole 
Oresme presented King Charles V of France with Le Livre de Ethiques d’Aristote, a 
French translation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.48 Oresme translated 
                                                            
45 Delumeau, La Peur en Occident, op. cit. 
46 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. and ed. Roger Crisp, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000, p. 49-51 (bk III, c. 7). 
47 Ibid., p. 51-3 (bk. III, c. 8). 
48 Nicole Oresme, Le Livre de ethiques d’Aristote, ed. A. D. Menut. New York, Stechert, 
1940. Aristotle’s ideas were also well-known in late medieval France thanks to other works 
such as the De regimine principum of Aegidius Romanus (Giles of Rome), translated into 
French by Henri de Gauchi, Li Livres du governement des rois, ed. S. P. Molenaer, London, 
Macmillan, 1899. 
Military Courage and Fear… 139 
Aristotle’s comments on the range of motivations for courage, including concern for 
personal honour and fear of either shame or punishment.49 Yet Oresme agreed with 
Aristotle that only courage in service to the common good was truly worthy and 
merited honour50 :  
 
Car autre chose est ouvrer principalment pour honneur et autre chose est ouvrer pour 
bien honneste, pour lequel est deü honneur. Semblablement, autre chose est ouvrer 
pour fuir vitupere et autre chose pour fuyr pechié, pour lequel est deü vitupere. Et 
pour ce, vraye fortitude est principalment pour honesté obtenir ou pour pechié fuyr. 
Et ceste fortitude civile est principalment pour honeur querir ou pour blasme fuyr. 
Mais elle est prochaine a la vraie vertu, car qui aime honneur c’est consequent fors 
que il aimme bien honneste pour lequel est deü honneur. Et ne convient fors que il 
prefere bien honeste a honeur et que il mue l’ordre de ceste amour que il ama vertu. 
Et a ce est disposé celui que a fortitude civile, et par continuer et acoustumance il 
peut legierement venir a vraie fortitude. Et semblablement peut on dire de la haine 
de vitupere et de la haine de pechié.51 
 
In his glosses, Oresme repeatedly emphasised the importance of courage in 
service to the common good,52 and argued that the best contexts in which the 
courageous and worthy man faces peril are “ceuls qui soustiennent peril de mort en 
bataille pour le bien commun. Car c’est un peril tresgrant et tres bon”.53  
Similarly, Honorat Bovet argued that true fortitude depended upon proper 
motivation. A knight who was fighting in a just war and defending a just cause had 
no fear of the danger to life and limb, and was displaying true fortitude : 
 
il a tout son plaisir et tout son delit à aller en armes et en justes guerres et à defendre 
toutes justes causes, querelles et saintes raisons [... et] voit le grant mal et le grant 
peril qui pourroit venir de faire telle guerre ou de maintenir telle querelle, mais ja 
pourtant il ne lairra son propos ne pour paine ou travail ne doubtera de exposer son 
corps en franche force et en justice droituriere.54 
 
Other warriors might be ‘bien hardy’, on the battlefield, but Bovet did not 
regard as virtuous those who were fighting for honour, out of fear of bring captured, 
out of habit instilled by training, out of trust in their equipment, horses or leaders, or 
even out of anger or sheer ignorance. The only virtue belonged to those who were 
truly courageous, understanding and fighting for reason and justice.55  
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The point, of course, was that for medieval intellectuals, inspired by 
Aristotle, the true training necessary for war was the same as for life in general, that 
is to say reflection on virtue and morality. The goal was to develop a moral, even 
intellectual courage. Such a view was no doubt a difficult concept for knights who  
 
aiment trop souvent la bataille pour elle-même, et non pour la cause qu’ils y 
défendent. Le vieux barbare des forêts germaines frémit encore sous leurs vêtements 
de mailles. A leurs yeux, c’est un charmant spectacle que le sang rouge coulant sur 
le fer de l’armure. Un beau coup de lance les transporte au ciel.56 
 
Nevertheless, the Aristotelian discussion did offer a far more practical 
concept of courage for medieval chivalry. Aristotle had famously argued that true 
courage or andreia was the mean between the extremes of fear (deilia in Greek or 
timor in Latin) and over-confidence (thrasutēs in Greek or audacia in Latin). True 
courage lay in conquering not just fear and cowardice, but also the over-confidence 
that would lead to rash, foolish choices.57 In other words, Aristotle avoided a 
simplistic polarization of courage and cowardice, and instead emphasised that true 
bravery lay not merely in overcoming fear, but also in avoiding hasty, impulsive, 
reckless and thoughtless action. 
Aristotle’s views were influential on theologians like St Thomas Aquinas 
who argued that fortitudo was the firmness of mind to accomplish virtue in general, 
and more specifically the virtue to face up to every danger without allowing fear to 
divert us, but also without rashness and audacity leading us to actions that will be 
equally unprofitable.58 Moreover, Aristotle’s ideas directly influenced key French 
intellectual debates on the subject of courage. In his glossary to Le Livre de Ethiques 
d’Aristote, Oresme explained that the cardinal virtue of “fortitude” was “la vertu 
moral par laquelle l’en se contient et porte deüement et convenablement vers choses 
terribles en fais de guerre”.59 Following Aristotle, Oresme defined “fortitude” as the 
proper mean between the two extremes of cowardice and rashness, “paours et 
hardiesces”.60  
The same argument was presented in the Arbre des batailles by Honorat 
Bovet, who argued that fortitude was a cardinal virtue, the strength of soul and the 
will to withstand any tribulation or temptation.61 In a military context, fortitude 
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prevented one from being overwhelmed by the cowardly desire to flee from a 
dangerous situation and the rash temptation to charge headlong into the enemy, an 
equally vicious and reprehensible action. In other words, fortitude was the virtuous 
mean between the two vices of “paour” and “hardiesse”.62 Bovet even argued that 
there could be circumstances in which it would be an act of fortitude to run away 
from a battle : 
 
Et se ung seul chevalier en vouloit attendre cent encore l’on ne diroit jamais que ce 
fust selon la vertu de force, ne de hardement, et pour ce en ceste vertu il y a trois 
choses, l’une est assaillir, l’aultre attendre et l’aultre fuir. Mais entre elles fault 
aucunes fois prendre le parti de fuir.63 
 
Oresme made the same argument in his translation of Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics, adding in the gloss : 
 
Item, les assaillans ou emprenans se reputent plus fors et doivent mieulx savoir ce 
qui il ont a faire, et quant et comment, que les actendans ou deffendans ; et ainsi est 
ce plus fort de soy bien deffendre par quoy il appert que ceste vertu est plus 
principalment en deffendant que en assaillant, ceteris paribus.64 
The crucial issue was that fortitude and courage was essentially about self-
control, a rational process by which the individual understands whether it was more 
appropriate to fight, to stand or simply to run away. The knight should deliberate 
carefully on the wisdom of their course of action, rather than rush into action out of 
anger or without true consideration of the risks that they are running in charging 
headlong at the enemy or suicidally facing up to an unbeatable enemy. As Oresme 
argued, “les fols hardis” are impetuous and eager but when danger actually arrives, 
they fall apart :  
 
Et la cause est que il ne sont pas meüs de l’abit de vertu qui est reglé par raison. 
Mais sont meüs de passion, de chaleur et esmouvement de fole hardiesce, autrement 
que raison ne desire. Et pour ce sont il au commencement impetueus et emprenans. 
Et aprés quant vient as perilz et leur premier mouvement est passé et refroidie ou 
destaint comme une legiere flambe ou comme une fumee, adonques le cuer ou le 
pouoir leur fault et se departent ou deslaissent a ouvrer.65 
 
These concerns were taken up in turn by Christine de Pizan in Le livre du 
corps de policie. She advised the aristocracy that courage ought to be based on 
reason, temperance and moderation. The truly brave warrior would limit his actions 
to the possible, avoiding foolhardiness that was not honourable.66 She repeated the 
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argument in her Livre des fais d’armes et de chevalerie, declaring that “hardiesce 
face a blasmer quant elle est folle”.67  
This rational attempt to separate true courage from the twin dangers of 
cowardice and rashness echoed the practical realities of the medieval battlefield. As 
Kaeuper has noted, “knights in historical combat frequently found it hard to restrain 
themselves and sought release in impetuous charges, disregarding some 
commander’s plan and strict orders.”68 Soldiers who were more intent on proving 
their own bravery than serving the collective cause represented a danger to the army 
as a whole. Despite the celebration of individual deeds of arms in chivalric 
narratives, battles were not won by the such acts, but rather through discipline and 
collective action. Thus Honorat Bovet emphasised that knights should be punished 
both for acts of cowardice and acts of false courage.69 He upheld the importance of 
martial discipline and the punishment of any knight who led an attack against the 
order of the constable or marshal of the army, whether or not the individual was 
successful.70  
Chroniclers did consistently draw attention to the rashness and over-
confidence of soldiers. For example, Froissart reported that Philip VI was so angry 
with the English that he would not delay the attack at Crécy, despite advice from Le 
Moine de Bazeilles who had scouted the enemy position.71 Froissart also blamed the 
French men-at-arms for being rash at Crécy, as did the Chronique des quatre 
premiers Valois which argued that the French lost the battle “par hastiveté et 
desarroy”.72 The Burgundian chronicler Jean Le Fèvre, reported that at Agincourt in 
1415, the French men-at-arms flooded across the battlefield as if entering a 
tournament. Moreover, Duke Antoine de Brabant arrived late and was so impatient 
to join the fray that he raced ahead of his company, used a banner as a surcoat and 
then was quickly killed by the English archers.73 In the Chronique de la Pucelle, 
Guillaume Cousinot, chancellor of the duke of Orléans, charged young French 
aristocrats and the Scottish troops led by Earl of Douglas with pushing for battle at 
Verneuil in 1424, describing them as hasty youths who rashly called for battle 
against the advice of the wise counsel of the elder figures on the council.74  
Nevertheless, chivalric chroniclers were usually more entranced by bold 
actions on the battlefield than the patient courage required to implement the 
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defensive battlefield tactics of the English men-at-arms, or even the simple 
perseverance to withstand the constant risks and dangers of the military campaign. 
Bovet observed that a young knight would receive more praise for attacking than for 
a successful defence against an assault, even though it was braver and more 
praiseworthy to hold one’s ground : 
 
vraiment bien attendre est plus vertueuse chose, plus forte et plus difficile que ce 
n’est de assaillir, car elle est de plus grande deliberation et plus froidement voit les 
perils de mort que ne fait celui qui assault, lequel en son courage a dejà prins ire par 
laquelle il ne peut coignoistre les perils où il se boute.75 
 
Indeed, the rational approach to courage encouraged by intellectuals was 
particularly important in relation to the difficult line between cowardice and sensible 
tactical restraint. Despite Léon Gautier’s blanket claim that the refusal to retreat 
from an enemy was one of the ‘ten commandments’ of chivalry, there were clearly 
circumstances in which avoiding battle or even fleeing would be logical and 
sensible.76 As Verbruggen argued “Men knew from experience that a lost battle did 
not necessarily mean a lost war, which would have been the case if they had all let 
themselves be killed ; the absolute concept of honour had to be reconciled with the 
interests of society and of human safety”.77 Joinville reported that at the battle of 
Mansourah in 1250, Erard de Siverey was concerned that he would be shamed if he 
rode to get help, so the chronicler had persuaded Erard that he would win great 
honour if he did manage to save their lives.78 While King Wenceslas accepted death 
in the battle of Crécy, Froissart reported that his son, Charles of Bohemia, left the 
battlefield when he saw that the tide was turning, as did Philip VI, though many 
chronicles did emphasise his attempts to rally his army and also suggested that he 
was led from the battlefield by Jean de Hainault.79  
There were countless times during the Hundred Years War when two armed 
lined up, banners unfurled, without either side taking the initiative so that a battle 
was effectively lost or “manquée”. In 1347, Philip VI challenged Edward III to 
abandon his camp outside Calais and meet them on open ground, which the English 
king declined.80 In 1424, Bedford and the French had agreed to fight outside Ivry on 
15th August, but when the French withdrew, Bedford was willing to take them on at 
Verneuil, a sight that was less favourable for him.81 Five years later, neither the 
encouragement of Joan of Arc nor the momentum created by previous victories at 
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Orléans, Beaugency and Patay could ensure that battle was joined with the English 
at Montépilloy in August 1429.82  
Yet military decisions about when to engage with an enemy or when to 
withdraw from the battle where influenced not merely by practical issues of strategy 
and tactical advantage, but also an awareness on the part of a commander that his 
actions would be judged both by posterity and the troops under his command. The 
chronicler Jean Le Bel dramatized the early years of the Hundred Years War as a 
struggle between the brave King Edward III, a worthy warrior in the Arthurian 
tradition, and the cautious and even cowardly King Philip VI.83 The French king 
repeatedly refused to accept battle under unfavourable conditions, until he finally 
launched an assault against the English forces at Crécy in 1346. Philip’s decision 
finally to accept a battle must have been influenced by an awareness of the need to 
act bravely in front of his own troops, especially when they enjoyed such a 
numerical advantage :  
 
When Philip VI mustered a royal host […] he was opening Pandora’s box. His 
actions, the strategy he adopted for the campaign, and the tone of his leadership 
would be closely watched and discussed [...] Caution in the face of the enemy, 
however sound the reasons underlying it, could carry a political price. A prolonged 
stand-off would test the strength of the bonds that held the army together. Tensions 
and rivalries could arise among the nobility.84  
 
For a commander like Philip VI, there was a very difficult balance between 
making a sensible military decision, and impressing an aristocracy brought up on 
notions of chivalric courage. Was it better to emulate the reckless but heroic courage 
of Roland in facing death, or the sound judgement of “sage” Oliver ?85  
Geoffroi de Charny declared in the Livre de chevalerie that young men-at-
arms should learn a range of practical skills, including how and when to make an 
honourable and safe withdrawal.86 He had explored the fine line between cowardice 
and a reasoned tactical withdrawal from battle in Les Demandes pour la joute, les 
tournois et la guerre. In the third section that concerned warfare, Charny posed 
seven questions relating to flight from a battle or a challenge, four of them directly 
asking whether a knight could either leave the battlefield or surrender with honour, 
questioning whether the enemy would be more encouraged by knights who fled the 
battle without striking a blow, or by others who surrendered without fighting.87 It 
seems likely that the Company would have frowned upon any attempt to leave a 
                                                            
82 Perceval de Cagny, Chronique des ducs d’Alençon, éd. H. Moranvillé, Paris, Société de 
l’Histoire de France, 1902, p. 161-4. 
83 Jean Le Bel, Chronique.  
84 Ayton, “The battle of Crécy”, p. 22-3. 
85 See footnote 3 above. 
86 Geoffroi de Charny, The Book of Chivalry, éd. cit., p. 102 : “du beau retraire seurement et 
honorablement quant il en est temps”. 
87 Taylor, A Critical Edition of Geoffroy de Charny’s “Livre Charny” and the “Demandes 
pour la joute, les tournois et la guerre”, p. 92, 103-4, 131 and 138. 
Military Courage and Fear… 145 
battlefield, judging by their oath not to flee from battle, as a result of which more 
than eighty members died at the battle of Mauron in Brittany in August 1352.88  
Military success or failure was the ultimate determinant of the wisdom of a 
commander’s decision. Winning a great victory might well wipe away any potential 
charge of rashness in engaging in a battle against the odds, as frequently happened 
when the English fought the French. In 1391, Hawkwood was trapped deep within 
Milanese territory and only escaped by indicating that he would do battle with the 
enemy army led by Jacopo dal Verme, and then running away under cover of night. 
Chroniclers contrasted his “prudence” with the rashness of his allies, led by Jean III, 
count of Armagnac, who rushed rashly and incautiously into battle with the 
Milanese forces of Jacopo dal Verme and were wiped out.89  
Of course, the repeated French military failures during the Hundred Years 
War encouraged the re-evaluation of the chivalric impulse to throw caution to the 
wind and to tackle a militarily superior enemy. Following the great defeats at Crécy 
and Poitiers, the French deliberately shunned battle against the English for large 
periods of time, while successive kings also gave up their role as leader of the army 
following the humiliating defeat and capture of King Jean II at Poitiers in 1356. This 
disaster forced a profound shift in French thinking on royal military leadership : 
Jean de Montreuil applauded Philip VI for having wisely fled the battlefield of 
Crécy and criticized Jean VI for failing to do the same at Poitiers.90 
The changing military circumstances may partially explain the overwhelming 
popularity of the simple common sense advice offered by the the Roman author, 
Vegetius, in the Epitoma rei militaris.91 Vegetius had been alive to the great dangers 
of warfare and hence the need to take a very carefully and considered view before 
committing to any military encounter.92 Moreover, he emphasised the importance of 
courage or virtus for the soldier, as a matter of real, practical importance because of 
his principle that bravery and morale were more important than numbers in 
determining the outcomes of battles : Amplius iuvat virtus quam multitudo.93 Indeed, 
he advised a commander never to lead a hesitant and frightened army into a pitched 
battle.94 
Christine de Pizan accepted that the presence of the king could give heart to 
the army, but argued that the ruler should avoid battle except against rebellious 
subjects, lest he be captured, dishonouring him, his blood and his subjects, and also 
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causing great harm to his country. Charles V therefore deserved praise for 
reconquering lands without moving from his throne.95 The king could retreat in the 
face of a route, because it was better to lose a battle than a monarch. Thus, 
Charles VII did well to abandon his original plan to lead the French army that fought 
the English at Verneuil in 1424, even if this did handle a moral advantage to the 
rival commander, the Regent Bedford.96 
 
Conclusion 
It would be dangerous to make too strong a comparison between debates 
about courage in late medieval France and late medieval England. Yet it is striking 
that the mounting sophistication of the French debate about courage, rashness and 
cowardice was rarely matched across the Channel during the Hundred Years War. A 
rare exception appeared in the Boke of noblesse, dedicated in 1475 to Edward IV by 
the English writer William Worcester. In a marginal note, Worcester reported that 
his patron, Sir John Fastolf, had advised young knights and nobles to heed the 
example of the ‘manly’ man who relied upon caution and good sense, rather than the 
“ardy” man who was courageous but far too rash, foolhardy and “bethout dicrecion 
of good avysement”.97  
Yet Worcester’s defence of the manly man was undoubtedly written, in part, 
as a defence of his own master’s supposed cowardice. In the aftermath of the French 
relief of Orléans in May 1429, Fastolf argued for a cautious and defensive strategy, 
but was overruled by the more aggressive Lord Talbot. The English army suffered a 
devastating defeat at the battle of Patay in June 1429, when the unmounted 
rearguard led by Lord Talbot and Lord Scales were captured. The remnants of the 
army escaped, led by Sir John Fastolf. The Burgundian chronicler, Jean de Wavrin, 
defended Fastolf’s retreat at Patay in 1429, reporting that the commander had had no 
fear of death or capture but was persuaded to withdraw by his captains. Of course 
Wavrin had served under Fastolf’s command in this engagement, and clearly had a 
stake in defending him. The same cannot be said of Jean de Bueil, whose subsequent 
account in Le Jouvencel praised Fastolf for saving his company.98 
 Yet in England, Fastolf was briefly suspended from the Order of the Garter 
and accused of cowardice by Talbot. Their difference of opinion over the tactical 
responses to the engagement at Patay, the obligations of membership of the Order of 
the Garter, and from a wider perspective of chivalry itself, underpinned a brutal 
personal dispute that lasted for over a decade.99 The charges were echoed in a suit 
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before the Parlement of Paris shortly afterwards, when Thomas Overton described 
his former master, Fastolf, as a “chevalier fuitif”. In response, Fastolf declared that 
the accusation of cowardice was “la plus grant charge qu’on puist dire d’un 
chevalier’ and roundly defended himself as “saige, vaillant et preux”. He claimed 
that that he had exercised tactical good sense and this argument carried the day, 
albeit it was only thirteen years later that Fastolf was reinstated into the Order of the 
Garter. His reputation never fully recovered.100 Meanwhile, John Talbot met his end 
at the battlefield at Castillon on 17 July 1453, when he refused to abandon the field 
against a French force equipped with artillery.101  
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